Would it be Better Without a Moral System?

Abstract

Bernard Williams emphasizes that we would be better off without morality, which one conceived as a distinctive system. He argues that even the purest and most rigorous articulation of morality, exemplified by Kant, fails to answer the Socratic question and cannot provide a defense of the ethical life adequately. Some scholars do not share this view of Williams. Some scholars contend that he misinterprets Kant’s view, while others maintain that a Kantian moral framework is far more significant than Williams allows. I argue, however, that such criticisms neglect Williams’s theoretical intent and practical insights, and therefore biases his project. Through an examination of Williams’s critique of Kantian notions of rational being, moral obligation, and universal necessity, I contend that Williams offers a more plausible interpretive understanding of the ethical life, one that invites us to reflect more deliberately on the tension between reflection and practice.